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Abstract: This paper reviews the extent of reductions in tariffs on environmental
goods (EGs) by country participation in the negotiations mandated by a Doha
Ministerial Decision in November 2001. Symptomatic of the cleavages across
countries throughout the Round, little progress was achieved during the
negotiations in deﬁning an approach to a multilateral reduction in protection of
EGs. Conﬂicting interests and differing perceptions of the beneﬁts from increased
trade in EGs was reﬂected in the different approaches proposed by members
(request and offer, integrated project, list approach, hybrid approach), and for the
few countries (13) that adopted a list approach, there was little overlap across
submissions. For all income groups, on average, EGs are less protected than other
goods and countries reduced protection by about 50% from initial levels in 1996
leaving little room for further exchange of market access. Difﬁculties in applying
the two complementary conceptions of EGs: (i) ‘goods for environmental manage-
ment’, and (ii) ‘environmentally preferable products’ are reviewed and mentioned
as reasons for the lack of progress during the negotiations. Inspection of the
submission lists against a ‘core list’ of 26 EGs drawn up by the WTO shows that
this ‘core list’ was mostly made up of products in which developed countries had
a comparative advantage, and that countries that submitted lists generally avoided
including on their lists the most highly protected goods.
1. Introduction
Reducing barriers to trade in environmental goods and services featured
prominently in the Doha Round negotiations where countries were asked to
negotiate on the elimination of protection on environmental goods and services
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(EGS).1 The recognized aim of these negotiations is to create a triple-win situation,
for trade, for development, and for the environment. First, if negotiations were
successful, trade would be facilitated through reduced or eliminated tariffs and
non-tariff barriers on EGS. This would decrease the cost of environmental
technologies, increase their use, and stimulate innovation and technology transfer.
Second, developing countries would beneﬁt in two ways from better market access
in EGS. Producers of EGS would have better access to large markets in Europe, the
US, and high-income Asia and it would be easier for developing countries as
a whole to obtain high-quality environmental goods on world markets. Such
access should, among other environmental beneﬁts, increase energy efﬁciency and
improve the water and sanitation situation in developing countries. Through
technology transfer, improved technologies would reduce emissions. Third, at the
global level, the environment would be better preserved, especially if a wide
deﬁnition of environmental goods were adopted to include as EGS those
environmental products and services with production characteristics that avoid
damaging the environment (e.g. the use of biodegradable materials, or goods
produced in an environmentally preferable way).
This paper reviews progress in unilateral reduction in tariffs on environmental
goods (EGs) and discusses reasons for the disappointing outcome so far at the
multilateral negotiations. Emphasis is on implications for developing countries.
We describe the lack of agreement on the approach to follow (list, project,
request and offer) and discuss the difﬁculties in establishing a list of products
for negotiation to reduce protection (six lists were submitted with little overlap
in products). We also show that unilaterally, no acceleration in the reduction in
tariffs on EGs has been observed since the launch of the negotiations ten years
ago, and draw the implications for middle and low-income countries if there
were agreement on a standstill which would bind tariffs at their current applied
levels.
Why so little progress? This disappointing outcome could reﬂect strategic
behavior (a bargaining chip in a framework where negotiations are multi-
dimensional). Here we explore two other reasons for the lack of progress. First,
we discuss the impact of inherent ‘technical’ difﬁculties in identifying EGs on
negotiations. Second, we analyze the characteristics of the goods submitted on the
six lists to see whether countries took a mercantilistic or an efﬁciency view in their
selection of products for inclusion on their respective lists. Our conclusion is that
1 The Doha round has been dubbed the Round for the ‘developing countries and for the protection of
the environment’. The Doha ministerial decision of November 2001, paragraph 31(iii) stated that ‘With a
view to enhancing the mutual supportiveness of trade and the environment, we agree to negotiations,
without prejudging their outcome, on: . . . (iii) the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tariff barriers
to environmental goods and services.’ Negotiations take place in the Special Session of the Committee on
Trade and the Environment (CTE in Special Session or CTESS). This paper only deals with environmental
goods (henceforth EGs).
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technical difﬁculties in deﬁning EGs and conﬂicting political economy motives both
contributed to the lack of progress in reducing barriers to trade in environmental
goods.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the approaches to
classiﬁcation suggested by countries. Among the proposals was a ‘list approach’
to the negotiations. Even though there was little overlap across the six proposed
lists that led to the WTO combined list of 411 products, it is used in Section 3
to show how protection of EGs has evolved over the period 1996–2010, the
longest period for which we have data at the HS-6 level on imports and
tariffs for a large number of countries. Section 4 explains how the inherent
difﬁculties in identifying those ‘goods and services which measure, prevent,
limit, minimize or correct environmental damage’ (OECD/EUROSTAT, 1999: 9)
prevent negotiations from progressing. Section 5 then turns to a discussion
of the political-economy determinants of goods proposed on the lists. Section 6
concludes.
2. Approaches and the different lists
There are no provisions in the WTO legal system related speciﬁcally to
environmental goods and services (EGS), except for the application of the MFN
clause and a general interdiction of quantitative restrictions which applies also
to trade in goods. Neither is there an agreed-upon deﬁnition of what an
‘environmental good’ is for the simple reason that the WTO legal system reﬂects
the results of previous rounds and jurisprudence and EGs were only introduced
in the Doha Round. Under the Committee on Trade and Environment in
Special Session (CTESS) Work Programme,2 WTO members were invited to
suggest approaches to reduce protection of ‘environmental goods’ and to make
submissions that would help deﬁne a ‘universe’ of ‘environmental goods’ (hereafter
EGs) subject to tariff reductions. We review the different approaches and the
submission process that resulted in the WTO ‘combined list’ of 411 HS-6 goods
and the subsequent ‘core list’ of 26 goods.
2.1 The different approaches
Until 2010, three broad approaches were proposed: the ‘List approach’,
the ‘Request and Offer approach’, and the ‘Integrated-Project approach’. Then,
during the recent intensiﬁcation of negotiations, ‘hybrid’ approaches were also
proposed.
2 Committee on Trade and Environment in Special Session, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador
Manuel A. J. Teehankee to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/18, 18 July 2008, WTO.
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(i) List approach: Under this approach, WTO members put lists of products up
for tariff reductions. According to a group of nine ‘friends’,3 goods on the agreed
list would be subject either to total tariff elimination or to a two-pronged
tariff elimination with a certain percentage of goods on the list to have tariffs
removed and the remainder eliminated in a phased down calendar. Another
option, proposed by the US4 would be a core list for tariff elimination and a
complementary list from which members would select a certain percentage of tariff
lines. Because developing countries felt that the core list would include mostly
goods of interest for developed countries, China proposed a common list and a
development list (drawn from the common list) for exemption or lower tariff
reductions to reﬂect the principle of ‘less than full reciprocity’.5
The core/common list with a complementary/development list reﬂects the view
that Members should ﬁrst agree on a reduced list of EGs to start the negotiations,
and that negotiations should take into account Special & Differential (S&D)
treatment via different lists, or differential treatment on a common list. However,
members failed to agree on such a list, although the group of nine ‘friends’
mentioned above proposed a set of 164 products in 2007 and 2009 as a ‘potential
set of convergence’ (the ‘friends’ or nine members’ – 9M – list).6 More recently,
other WTO members have also identiﬁed 26 products as a potential starting-point
for negotiations (the ‘core list’, see below).
(ii) Request and offer, proposed by Brazil in 2007.7 Here countries would request
speciﬁc tariff cut commitments on products of interest and then extend these tariff-
cuts to all WTO members based on the MFN clause. Some developing countries
perceived that this approach would shield them from a formula-based across-the-
board tariff reduction.8
3 ‘Continued Work Under Paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration –Non-Paper by
Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen andMatsu, Switzerland, and the United States of America’, JOB(09)/
132, 9 October 2009, WTO.
4 ‘Liberalizing Environmental Goods in the WTO: Approaching the Deﬁnition Issue’, TN/TE/W/34,
19 June 2003, WTO, and ‘Market Access for Non-Agricultural Products: Us Contribution on an
Environmental Good Modality’, TN/TE/W/38, 7 July 2003, WTO.
5 ‘Statement by China on Environmental Goods at the Committee on Trade and Environment Special
Session (CTESS)’, TN/TE/W/42, 6 July 2004, meeting of 22 June 2004, WTO.
6 ‘Continued Work under Paragraph 31 (iii) of the Doha Ministerial Declaration –Non-Paper by
Canada, the European Communities, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, the Separate Customs
Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen andMatsu, Switzerland, and the United States of America’, JOB(07)/
54, 27 April 2007, WTO; JOB(09)/132, 9 October2009, supra note 3.
7 ‘Environmental Goods for Development – Submission by Brazil’, JOB(07)/146, 1 October 2007,
WTO; ‘Scheme for Request and Offer Procedure in Environmental Goods –Non-Paper by Brazil’, JOB(09)/
184, 15 December 2009, WTO.
8 To work, as was the case under the early days of multilateral tariff reductions, the request-and-offer
approach requires sufﬁciently high tariffs among principal-suppliers to generate beneﬁts on both sides.
Reductions from current tariffs levels would not generate signiﬁcant gains among negotiating partners.
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(iii) Integrated-project, proposed by Argentina and India.9 Here, national
authorities would select projects (for instance under the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol), thereby addressing the ‘multiple-uses’ issue
raised by the list approaches (see below). EGS necessary for the selected projects
would then temporarily beneﬁt from enhanced market access. This approach
does not require international agreement, but this is at the cost of uncertainty
for exporters (even if categories of goods were to be identiﬁed multilaterally in
advance).
(iv) Hybrid approach, proposed by Australia, Colombia, Hong Kong, Norway,
and Singapore.10 This proposal combines all the elements on the table: (a) an
agreed core list on which all members would make commitments (proponents
of this Hybrid approach have identiﬁed 26 HS-6-digit codes from the reference
universe on an illustrative and starting-point basis, see below); (b) a complementary
self-selected list (mainly for developed countries); (c) a complementary request-
offer approach, the outcome of which would be multilateralized on an MFN
basis; and (d) environmental projects could be used to identify other lines as of
environmental interest.
2.2 The submission process leading to the ‘WTO combined’ (411 HS codes)
and ‘core’ (26 HS codes) lists
Following an initial period of illustrative submissions between 2002 and 2005,11
under the 2008 CTESS Work Programme, WTO members were ofﬁcially invited
‘to make submissions identifying EGs of interest to them across as many categories
as possible, and/or EGs identiﬁed in any requests/offers they would have made to
other Members’ to determine the ‘universe’ of EGs, and to identify environmental
categories for the project approach. For the reasons discussed above, with the
exception of the Philippines, developing countries did not participate. Thirteen
countries participated in the submission process resulting in six lists once nine
members submitted their joint ‘Friends list’ (number of HS-2002 6-digit codes
9 ‘The Doha Round and Climate Change – Submission by Argentina’, TN/TE/W/74, 23 November
2009, WTO; ‘Integrated Proposal on Environmental Goods for Development – Submission by Argentina’,
TN/TE/W/62, 14 October 2005, WTO; ‘Integrated Approach to Paragraph 31(iii) – Submission by
Argentina and India’, Job(07)/77, 6 June 2007, WTO; ‘An Alternative Approach for Negotiations under
Paragraph 31(iii) – Submission by India’, TN/TE/W/51, 3 June 2005, WTO; ‘Environmental Project
Approach: Compatibility and Criteria – Submission by India’, TN/TE/W/67, 13 June 2006, WTO;
‘Procedural and Technical Aspects of the Environmental Project Approach – Submission by India’,
TN/TE/W/60, 19 September 2005, WTO; ‘Structural Dimensions of the Environmental Project
Approach – Submission by India’, TN/TE/W/54, July 2005, WTO.
10 ‘A Hybrid Approach to the Liberalization of Environmental Goods under Paragraph 31
(iii) – Submission by Australia; Colombia; Hong Kong, China; Norway; and Singapore’, JOB/TE/15,
8 March 2011, WTO.
11During this period, nine WTO members made one or more EGs list submissions, often based on
previous suggestions made by the OECD or APEC (see Steenblik, 2005a).
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in parenthesis): Saudi Arabia (262), Japan (57), Philippines (17), Qatar (20),
Singapore (72), and the group of nine Friends (164), which includes Japan.12
Figure 1 shows the very limited overlap across lists suggestive of the diverging
positions as to countries’ perceptions about which goods should be considered as
‘environmental’, but also suggests conceptual difﬁculties in identifying what an
environmental good is (see Section 4 below). In fact, not a single product appears
on all six lists and more than two-thirds of the products proposed appear only on
one list. Only seven products are common to four lists. More than 80% of the 90
duplicates belong to the nine Friends’ list, of which almost three quarters (54 HS
codes) are common also to Saudi Arabia’s list, and another quarter (20 HS codes)
common to Singapore’s proposal.
Figure 1. The geography of overlaps: WTO list (411 products)
Source: Adapted from Vesile Kulaçog˘lu, Contribution of Trade Opening to Access to Climate-Friendly
Goods and Services, WTO Trade and Environment Division, WTO Side Event at COP16, 8 December
2010.
12 It is likely that the submission from the Philippines was under the pressure of the then Chairman of
the CTESS, Manuel A .J. Teehankee, the Philippine Permanent Representative to the WTO in Geneva. The
Friends’ list (or the NineMembers – 9M – list) includes a merger of individual submissions previously made
by Canada, the European Union, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Switzerland, Taiwan, and the United Sates,
with Norway joining the list without making individual submissions.
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Due to partial overlaps, the combined list (hereafter the ‘WTO list’) contains 411
unique HS-2002 6-digit level codes (see Balineau and de Melo, 2011: annex II),13
from which, Australia, Colombia, Hong Kong, Norway, and Singapore drew a
‘core list’ of 26 products in 2011 that could serve as a starting point for WTO
negotiations. A limited overlap across lists demonstrates the limited commonality
in perception and likely makes it more difﬁcult to reach an agreement. It could be,
however, that if countries were to mutually recognize each other’s lists, reduction in
trade barriers to trade in EGs would be deeper.
The 411 HS-6 codes fall within 24 of the 96 2-digit HS-2002 Chapter
classiﬁcation, with almost one-third under HS Chapter 84 (machinery and
mechanical appliances, for example pumps for air handling equipment, turbines,
and machinery for waste management). Chapter 85 (electrical machinery such as
generators), Chapter 90 (precision instruments to monitor and analyze the
environment), and Chapter 73 (articles of iron or steel like tubes, pipes, tanks and
reservoirs for water treatment) respectively account for 16%, 13%, and 11% of the
WTO combined list of EGs. Energy-efﬁcient or cleaner vehicles (Chapter 87)
proposed by Japan account for 7% of the list. Ethers and ketones of Chapter 29
(proposed by Saudi Arabia as ‘Carbon Capture and Storage’ (CCS), ‘Gas ﬂaring
emission reduction’, or ‘Efﬁcient Consumption of Energy’ (EC) technologies)
account for another 7%. Plastic articles (Chapter 39), mainly suggested by Saudi
Arabia as CCS- or EC-technologies, account for 5%.
Table 1 lists the 26 HS codes of the ‘core list’, the countries that proposed
the good in individual submission, and the categories under which that good
was classiﬁed in the submission. Among these goods identiﬁed as ‘clear
environmental goods’ in the ‘core’ list, seven are singles, ﬁve are common to
two submissions, 11 are common to three submissions, three are quadrupli-
cates, and 23 are on the Friends’ list. Chapter 84 accounts for half of the
goods on the core list, the remainder being distributed between Chapters 85,
90, and 73.
3. How much reduction in protection
As a ﬁrst check on progress in reducing barriers, we plotted the shares of imports
of EGs by income group for the core and combined lists over the period 2000–10
13 ‘Committee on Trade and Environment Special Session’, Report by the Chairman, Ambassador
Manuel A. J. Teehankee, to the Trade Negotiations Committee, TN/TE/20, 21 April 2011, WTO. The ﬁnal
list compiled by the contains 408 6-digit HS-2002 six-digit level codes. However, the list we use for this
work contains 411 6-digit HS-2002 six-digit level codes. This is because we make additional corrections
looking at products descriptions provided by Members (see Balineau and De Melo, 2011: annex II).
Because some countries prefer the Project or Request approaches, members were also asked to submit their
products under pre-identiﬁed categories and/or suggest new categories (see ibid.: annex II, table II-B and
table 1, column ‘Categories’).
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Table 1. The ‘Core List’
No.
HS 2002
CODE HS code description Members(a) Category(ies)(b)
1 460120 Mats, matting and screens of vegetable
materials
PHL WM/WT
2 730820 Towers & lattice masts 9M, PHL, SGP RE
3 732111 Cooking appliances and plate warmers. 9M ET
4 732490 Other sanitary ware and parts thereof,
of iron or steel
9M, SAU WM/WT, ET, CCS
5 840290 Steam or other vapour generating boilers;
super-heated water boilers: Parts
9M, SAU, PHL WM/WT, ET, CCS
6 840410 Auxiliary plant for use with boilers of
heading 84.02 or 84.03; condensers for
steam or other vapour power units
9M, SAU, PHL WM/WT,
ET, CCS
7 840510 Producer gas or water gas generators;
acetylene gas generators and similar
water process gas generators
9M, SAU, PHL,
SGP
APC, RE, WM/WT,
ET, CCS
8 840681 Steam turbines and other vapour turbines
for marine propulsion: Of an output
exceeding 40 MW
9M, SAU, PHL RE
9 840999 Parts suitable for use solely or principally
with the engines of heading 84.07
or 84.08
9M, SAU, SGP APC, ET, CCS
10 841011 Hydraulic turbines and water wheels
of a power not exceeding 1,000 kW
9M, SAU, PHL RE, ET, CCS
11 841012 Hydraulic Turbines and Water Wheels,
Power 1, 000−10, 000kw
SAU ET, CCS
12 841090 Hydraulic turbines, water wheels, and
regulators ; parts, including regulators
9M, SAU, PHL RE, ET, CCS
13 841181 Other gas turbines of a power not
exceeding 5,000 kW
9M, SAU, PHL,
QAT
RE, ET, CCS, OTH
14 841182 Other gas turbines of a power exceeding
5,000 kW
9M, SAU, PHL,
QAT
RE, ET, CCS, OTH
15 841861 Other refrigerating equipment; heat
pumps: Compression-type units whose
condensers are heat exchangers
9M RE
16 841919 Instantaneous or storage water heaters,
non-electric: Other
9M, PHL RE
17 841950 Heat exchange units 9M, SAU, PHL RE, ET, CCS
18 847989 Other machines and mechanical
appliances: Other
9M, SGP APC, WM/WT, RE
19 850231 Other generating sets: Wind-powered 9M, PHL, SGP RE
20 850410 Ballasts for discharge lamps or tubes SAU ET, CCS
21 853710 Boards, panels, consoles, desks, cabinets
and other bases, for electric control
or the distribution of electricity
9M, PHL RE
22 854140 Photosensitive semiconductor devices,
including photovoltaic cells; light
emitting diodes.
9M, PHL, SGP RE
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(see Balineau and de Melo, 2011: ﬁgure VI-A, annex VI).14 For the combined list,
the share is unchanged at 20% for the high-income group, rises from 15% to 20%+
for the lower-middle and upper-middle groups and from 12% to 38% for the low-
income group. For the core list, the graph shows that the share of EGs in total
imports ﬂuctuates between 0.5% and 1% for the low-income countries and 1.5%
and 2% for the lower-middle-income countries. Since the combined list includes
many multi-purpose goods (e.g. vehicles or parts), working with the core list is
more representative of what has been done in reducing protection on EGs over the
period. Then we compare tariff reductions for EGs with tariff reduction on non-
EGs by taking ﬁve-year averages over intervals starting in 1996 to see if there are
any noticeable differences.
Four patterns are apparent in the data describing the evolution of applied tariffs
by income group in ﬁgure 2 for the ‘core list’ (very similar results hold for the
‘combined list’ in Balineau and de Melo, 2011: annex V). First, protection of EGs
remains highest in the low-income group. But with average tariffs in the 10%–15%
range, this was barely high enough to be rewarding for a bilateral barter among
developing countries by a request-and-offer approach. As to developed countries,
Table 1. (Cont.)
No.
HS 2002
CODE HS code description Members(a) Category(ies)(b)
23 900190 Lenses, prisms, mirrors and other
optical elements, of any material,
unmounted: other
9M RE
24 900290 Lenses, prisms, mirrors and other
optical elements, of any material,
mounted: other
9M RE
25 902730 Spectrometers, spectrophotometers
and spectrographs using optical
radiations (UV, visible, IR)
9M, SGP ET
26 903210 Thermostats 9M, SAU, SGP ET, CCS
Source: Authors, compiled from country submissions and TN/TE/20.
Notes: (a) 9M=Nine Friends, PHL=Philippines, SGP=Singapore, SAU=Saudi Arabia, QAT=Qatar,
(b) EG categories: APC=Air Pollution Control, RE=Renewable Energy, ET=Environmental Energy,
CCS=Carbon Capture and Storage, WM/WT=Water Management/Water Treatment, OTH=Other.
14 Data used in this paper are described in Balineau and de Melo, 2011: annex IV. The sample is
restricted to 123 countries with available data and above 1 million people (population data source:World
Development Indicators, World Bank, January 2011; number of countries per income group in
parenthesis: high-income (20); upper-middle-income (31); lower-middle (38); low-income (34)).
European Union means the EU15 to keep consistent time series. Intra-EU trade is excluded, as are other
EU members.
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average tariffs were around 5%, so their expected gains from participation in the
negotiations would be from reduction in tariffs for developing countries. Second,
the absolute gap in protection between the low-income group and the other
developing groups remained constant, and the number of duty-free tariff lines is
still very low for the low-income group, standing barely above 10% at the end
of the period (see Balineau and de Melo, 2011: ﬁgure VI-B in annex VI). Third,
the data show a steady decline in tariffs across income groups, all groups
reducing tariffs by about 50% over the period (tariffs have been reduced by an
average of 6 percentage points, ranging from 2 percentage points for high-
income to 11 percentage points for low-income countries – see ibid.: table VI-C
in annex VI). Fourth, for all income groups, EGs are less protected on average
than other goods, but the gap in average protection has remained fairly constant
for all products and across groups (similar results are reported by Monkelbaan
(2011) on the basis of inspection of the Friends’ list). Insofar as EGs are mostly
made up of intermediate goods, this pattern is to be expected from an outcome
in which tariff levels are at least partly determined by lobbying activities, which
will be more intensely directed against intermediate goods (see e.g. Cadot et al.,
2005).
Turning to the pattern of reduction in protection for the EG group, the data
show no acceleration in the reduction in tariffs on EGs relative to other products
as the Doha negotiations proceeded. This was especially the case for the low-
income group where the reduction in protection was greatest during the 2002–04
Figure 2. Evolution of the average rate of protection, 1996–2010 (by income
group)
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Source: Authors’ calculations, from TRAINS tariff data (see Balineau and de Melo, 2011: Annex IV).
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period.15 As shown in ﬁgure 3, this means that in a standstill compromise, whereby
tariffs would be bound at the current applied MFN rate rather than at the current
bound rate, the high-income group would not lose much leeway in tariff-setting
since for most countries in the group applied tariffs are already at their bound
levels. The upper middle-income countries would lose the most leeway.16
Otherwise, as expected, the removal of ﬂexibility in tariff-setting would hit the
low-income group more than the lower-middle-income group, an observation also
made by Vossenaar (2010) and Monkelbaan (2011).
Figure 3. MFN applied tariffs and bound tariffs for EGs in 2010 (Core list
26 products)
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Notes: Sample: Only 104 WTO members for which MFN and bound tariff information is available.
Tariffs weighted by the country-product share in total import value.
Source: Authors’ calculations from TRAINS tariff data (see Balineau and de Melo, 2011: Annex IV).
15 The same conclusion emerges when the comparisons are carried out on the number of HS-6 lines
with zero protection over the period. High-income countries had about one-third of tariff lines duty-free by
the end of the period, while low-income countries, who would presumably gain the most from the adoption
of imported technologies, only had 15% of duty-free tariff lines (even though there was a 50% increase in
the number of zero-tariff lines) (see Balineau and De Melo, 2011, ﬁgure VI-B).
16 This is due to the combined effects of the larger unilateral tariff reductions in this group of countries
and their having a greater proportion of bound tariff lines. Most Latin American countries in the sample
(Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela) have bound tariffs in the 30% range and applied tariffs
around 10%. The different averages by income group in ﬁgures 2 and 3 are due to slightly different samples
and years, and also to the weighing by imports, which lowers averages since imports for goods with high
tariffs are lower.
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We also examined cases of ‘substantial tariff reductions’ deﬁned as tariff
reductions of 5 percentage points or more, e.g. a tariff that is reduced from 12%
to 7%, where the threshold was chosen to correspond to the reduction in tariffs
over the sample during the 1996–2010 period (6 percentage points, see table VI-C).
Results show that two-thirds of the countries (86) had at least one substantial
tariff reduction (i.e. an ‘event’) during 1996–2010 (i.e. a reduction of at least
5 percentage points). Three patterns emerge: (i) events are fairly evenly distributed
across products (HS-6-digit codes) with each product in the core list accounting for
about 4%–5.30% of the number of events; (ii) events were concentrated in the
middle-income group; (iii) the upper-middle-income and low-income groups had
the highest average absolute reduction per event. Considering that the average
reduction was more than 12 percentage points for these groups, it is likely that the
greatest efﬁciency gains from tariff reduction took place in upper-middle-income
and low-income groups.17
In Balineau and de Melo (2011), we also estimated import responses for
those occurrences of ‘substantial’ (5 percentage points) tariff reductions. The
estimates show that for about 65% of the events, the average imports were
higher after the event than before the tariff reduction, and, on average, imports
were between 50% and 100% higher after the reduction in tariffs. Since under
normal circumstances, imports would be growing in real terms, we carried out
the same estimates for the control group (i.e. the HS-6 tariff lines that did
not have an event during the period). Import growth was less in the control
group, but not signiﬁcantly so (see Balineau and de Melo, 2011: table 3). In
sum, the event analysis does not suggest a signiﬁcant import response to tariff
reductions.18
Why so little progress? As pointed out in the introduction, this could reﬂect
strategic behavior (a bargaining chip in a framework where negotiations are multi-
dimensional). The next sections explore two other reasons for the lack of progress.
Section 4 discusses how the inherent ‘technical’ difﬁculties in identifying EGs could
prevent the negotiations from progressing. Section 5 analyzes the characteristics of
the goods submitted on the six lists to see whether countries took a mercantilistic
or an efﬁciency view in their selection of products for inclusion on their respective
lists.
17 Taking a closer look at the statistics by country and product, it appears that Pakistan, India, Kenya,
Malawi, and Tanzania were the top ﬁve countries in terms of events. In the sample of top reducers,
Bangladesh, Iran, Cameroon, Mauritius, and Rwanda had the largest average reduction per event (from –
22 percentage points for Rwanda to –41 percentage points for Bangladesh).
18 Besides the high degree of disaggregation of our estimates that introduces noise in the data, as
pointed out by Jha (2008), other factors such as environmental regulations could affect the demand for EGs
much more than tariffs. The problem is that these factors are not available at the HS-6 level.
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4. Difﬁculties and obstacles in selecting environmental goods
Figure 1 showed the limited overlap between lists, illustrating the difﬁculties in
building a consensus about what products should be considered as ‘environmental
goods’. Since countries were asked to provide next to each HS product code one
of six categories to which they think the product belongs (see the deﬁnitions in the
bottom of table 1), and any comments on the environment beneﬁt or rationale
for the selection of that particular product, it is easy to see that the submitters of
EGs lists disagreed as much about this classiﬁcation as they did about the choice of
products. For the 90 duplicates, only 31 were grouped in the same category by
both submitters. For the 59 remaining products, that is to say for over two-thirds
of the HS codes that were proposed by more than one country or group, there is
no consensus about the classiﬁcation of the environmental beneﬁts of these
products.19
This disagreement on the deﬁnition of EGs and on the beneﬁts provided by
EGs reﬂects the members’ diverging perceptions as to their interests which
are accommodated in the two complementary conceptions of EGs: (i) ‘goods
for environmental management’ –GEM20 – and; (ii) ‘environmentally preferable
products’ – EPPs) in the literature (see for example OECD/Eurostat, 1999, and
Hamwey, 2005). We present both showing how the difﬁculty in operationalizing
them contributed to the stalemate in the negotiations.
4.1 EGs as ‘goods for environmental management’ (GEM)
GEM can be deﬁned as ‘products [and services] that reduce environmental risk
and minimize pollution and resource use’ (OECD/Eurostat, 1999: 9). This
category includes goods and services used in ‘pollution management’ (e.g. tubes,
pipes, ﬁlters and chemicals used in sewage and wastewater treatment; mixing,
kneading, grinding machines used for solid waste recycling services; pumps, air
compressors used to control air pollution; and measuring equipment to monitor
the environment (optical instruments for example)). It comprises also ‘resource
management’ products such as renewable energy equipment (towers and lattice
19Different categorizations indicate that environmental goods may address different environmental
problems. To give an example, in the recent APEC list of 54 products submitted for reduction in tariffs in
September 2012, HS 842129 (Filtering or purifying machinery and apparatus for liquids) has been
proposed by the US as well as Canada and other members. But under the environmental end-use column,
Canada, Japan, New Zealand and Korea describe the product as being relevant for removal of
contaminants fromwastewater, while the US considers that the process prevents the emission of a variety of
air pollutants. So it is conceivable that the same HS category would be placed under air pollution control by
some and waste-water treatment by others, both of which would be correct.
20 This expression is ours and comprises both the ‘pollution management’ and ‘resources management’
groups identiﬁed by the OECD/Eurostat (1999). UNCTAD refers to these products as ‘Type A EGs’
(Hamwey, 2005), while the ICTSD refers to them as ‘established environmental technologies’ (EET)
(Howse and Bork, 2006). For more details on the classiﬁcation of EGs, see ﬁgure 1 in the discussion paper
version (Balineau and De Melo, 2011).
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masts for wind turbines, photosensitive devices and optical ﬁbers used to
generate, concentrate or intensify solar power) or indoor air pollution control
equipment.
The main difﬁculty with GEM is that they generally have multiple end-uses. For
example, tubes and pipes used in water treatment can also be used for the transport
of natural gas. Several WTO members, including developing countries, have tabled
an informal document stressing the importance of only liberalizing trade in
environmental goods that serve a single environmental end-use (Claro et al.,
2007: 8). However, if a list approach is used to identify EGs, there is a major
identiﬁcation problem as the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding
System (HS) was not designed according to end-use. A ﬁner HS classiﬁcation
specifying ‘ex-outs’ (goods which are not separately identiﬁed at the HS-6
harmonized level so that they have to be identiﬁed in national tariff schedules at
the eight- or ten-digit level) could partially help solve the multiple-use problem, but
this would be particularly costly and difﬁcult to implement for some developing
countries. Moreover, this is only a partial solution (Steenblik, 2005b; Kim, 2007).
Another way to deal with multiple end-uses is to use a project approach
in assessing whether the product (e.g. a turbine) being used is to improve
the environment, which is the justiﬁcation for the deﬁne-by-doing-approach. For
example, among competing approaches that have been proposed to liberalize
goods, those proposed by India (‘the project approach’) and Argentina
(‘the integrated approach’) avoid the dual-use problem. However, this approach
has its own drawbacks as it is ‘temporary’ and up for capture by interest groups.
Under these approaches, only EGs selected by national authorities for environ-
mental projects would temporarily beneﬁt from enhanced market access.
4.2 EGs as ‘environmentally preferable products’ (EPPs)
Contrary to GEM, environmentally preferable products (EPPs)21 are single-use
products that produce less environmental damage either in their production, their
use, or their disposal. Each EPP has a close substitute, with a similar use but which
is less environmentally preferable (for example the use of biodegradable vs. non-
biodegradable products).22 The main problem with EPPs is ‘relativism’, in the sense
that criteria to judge what is ‘environmental friendly’ are lacking. Apart from the
divergence in preferences (conceptions of the ‘environment’), this is also due to the
21Hamwey (2005: 2) refers to as ‘Type B products’ and deﬁnes them as ‘industrial and consumer goods
not primarily used for environmental purposes but whose production, end-use or disposal have reduced
negative, or potentially positive, environmental impacts relative to substitute goods providing similar
function and utility’.
22 In reality, there is some overlap between GEM and EPPs (Hamwey, 2005: 4): ﬁrst, some EPPs may
be used to prevent or treat environmental problems as well (e.g. clean recycling machinery). Second,
renewable energy equipment could be in either GEM of EPPs: equipment used in renewable energy plants
would fall under GEM, whereas consumer goods could fall under EPP (solar cars, biofuels).
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hurdles facing the completion of a life-cycle assessment (LCA)23 as an EPP may be
used and disposed of in different ways (Hamwey, 2005). For other goods or human
activities, criteria are lacking because of scientiﬁc knowledge gaps (particularly for
those goods differentiated by processes and production methods (PPM) of which
the impact is ‘indeterminate’ (see Balineau and Dufeu, 2010; Moïsé and Steenblik,
2011). For example, whereas Brazil proposed the inclusion of biofuels in EGs,24
Steenblik (2007) and Hufbauer et al. (2009) stress that the use of bio-fuels to save
on energy and to reduce CO2 emissions is doubtful. Without clear scientiﬁc
knowledge to bring to the negotiations, Brazil’s pursuit of its export interests would
be preferable to production of biofuels by the EU or the US, but still be detrimental
for the environment.
Besides, because most if not all EPPs have conventional counterparts, further
liberalization for EPPs would require dealing with the problem of ‘like products’ so
that the promotion of trade in EGs would not create unnecessary restrictions to
international trade (contrary to GATT article XI). This problem affects goods
which differ in their processes or production methods without being modiﬁed
in their ﬁnal physical characteristics (in that case PPMs are referred to as ‘non-
product-related’ PPMs), as customs agents cannot discriminate among products
based on the way they are produced. For instance, while some governments may
want to discriminate between wood products derived from sustainably grown
forests from other wood products, they cannot do so if the unlikeliness of these
two types of wood products is not established. While discrimination according
to PPMs would be seem possible, especially if human health or the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources is concerned, the jurisprudence at the GATT/WTO
on PPMs is still in ﬂux. More importantly, such discrimination (through applying
differential tariff rates) would require agreement on universally accepted labels in
an extended HS classiﬁcation. Moreover, several members, including developing
countries, are against designating PPMs-based EGs. Developing countries actually
fear that this would open the door to discrimination against their products based
on other than environmental concerns (e.g. ‘social concerns’ based on the absence
of legislation on domestic workers’ rights).25 Other members (e.g. the European
23 See e.g. Brenton et al. (2009) for a discussion of the difﬁculty in establishing carbon footprints for
food systems, especially in developing countries where emissions from land-use change are difﬁcult to
evaluate.
24 ‘Environmental Goods and Services, Paragraph 31 (iii) –Communication from Brazil – Biofuels’,
JOB/TE/6, 1 July 2010, WTO.
25 Relevant environmental WTO cases are: US-Gasoline (DS2 and DS4), US-Shrimp (e.g. DS429) and
Brazil-Retreaded Tyres (DS332). In a ﬁrst decision by the Appellate Body in the Tuna-Dolphin (DS381)
case involving the US and Mexico (under the GATT), the US lost the case when it argued that tuna could
only be imported if it was caught in purse-seine nets, jurisprudence that was overturned later in the Shrimp–
Turtle (DS58) decision which in effect allowed that PPMs could be invoked at the WTO for contingent
protection. Technically, the Shrimp–Turtle case did not explicitly approve the so-called non-product related
processes and production methods, but, as a result of the case, it could under certain circumstances be
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Union and Switzerland) suggested that product-related PPMs (i.e. PPMs that
modiﬁed the ﬁnal physical characteristics of products in a way that their use or
disposal is less harmful for the environment) could beneﬁt from additional
discussions. Peru proposed to include organic products in EGs.26 The difﬁculty
here is to prove that organic production methods are product-related (e.g.
consumers may want to rinse thoroughly a chemically treated apple while wasting
less water with an organic apple, see UNEP and IISD, 2005), and subsequently
to reﬂect this agreement in a suitably modiﬁed HS system according to a universally
accepted label.27
5. The political economy of submissions
For countries that submitted lists, the selection of goods was governed by a
combination of overall efﬁciency considerations and narrower interests of pressure
groups. If the strongest lobbies are in exporting activities, then goods on the
list would be in sectors in which the country has a comparative advantage (here
measured by an index of Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) deﬁned below)
in which case the selection would be welfare-enhancing. If, on the contrary, the
strongest pressure groups are in highly protected import-competing industries, then
the results of lobbying would be to avoid the submission of goods with high tariffs
(here deﬁned by goods with tariff peaks, also deﬁned below, and the selection
process would not have been guided by efﬁciency criteria). If the selection of goods
was governed by efﬁciency considerations, the list would include either (or both)
goods with high tariffs and/or goods in which the country has a comparative
advantage.
In sum, if members were intent on reducing barriers to trade in EGs, they would
include in their submission list goods with relatively high tariffs as this would
lead to a more substantial reduction in barriers to trade in EGs. Alternatively,
or concurrently, countries might take a more mercantilistic view and propose
for inclusion in the list products in which they perceive they have a comparative
advantage that they could exploit if tariffs were lowered by other countries.
Submitting for inclusion in a list a product in which a country has a comparative
justiﬁed under the GATT’s article XX exception clauses. In the EC–Asbestos case opposing Canada and the
EU (DS 135), see Conconi and Howse, 2011), the Appellate Body upheld the EU position that
discrimination based on PPM-related criteria could be applied when human health was involved.
26 ‘Environmental Goods and Services for Sustainable Development –Communication from Peru’, JOB
(09)/177, 27 November 2009, WTO.
27 This also raises the question of non-tariff barriers and international standards. There are some
proposals on the table, relating in particular to the harmonization of standards on organic products
(‘Environmental Goods for Development – Submission by Brazil’, JOB(07)/146, 1 October 2007, WTO)
and energy-efﬁcient goods (‘Proposal on Product List for Environmental Goods and Services – Submission
from Japan’, TN/TE/W/75/Add.1, 16 February 2010, WTO). On NTBs to trade in EGs, see also Vossenaar
(2010).
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advantage is then also efﬁciency-enhancing. On the other hand, not submitting
goods that are highly protected is inefﬁcient and very likely to represent
a protectionist motive.
We examine both possibilities. First, we verify that the selection of the 411 goods
in the WTO combined list was not random. Next, we check whether countries
submitted mostly goods in which they had high tariffs (measured by the percentage
of submissions from goods with tariff peaks) or goods in which they had a
comparative advantage (measured by the index of Revealed Comparative
Advantage (RCA)). The formula for the RCA is:
RCAji =
Ei,j/
∑
j Ei,j
( )
∑
i Ei,j
( )
/
∑
i
∑
j Ei,j
( ) i = 1, . . . ,154; j = 1, . . . ,4920 (0.1)
where Ei,j is exports by country i of good j (where intra-EU27 trade is excluded).
The formula says that country i has a RCA in good j if (RCAi
j>1), i.e. if country i’s
share of good j, say shirts, in i’s total exports is greater than the share of shirts in
total world exports.
Table 2 displays the share of goods with RCA>1 for the countries that submitted
lists and, in the bottom, for a selection of other countries that might (but did
not) participate in the submission process. Column 2 shows the share of goods
with an RCA>1 in total trade and column 3 reports the percentage of goods
with an RCA>1 among EGs (i.e among the 411 goods in the WTO’s combined
list – henceforth the EG list). For example, the EU has an RCA>1 for 45% of its
exports and an RCA>1 for 68% of the goods on the EG list.
With an RCA>1 for more than 30% of the products in the EG list, high-income
countries and China lead in terms of the number of EGs in which they have a
comparative advantage. Because the RCA also reﬂects countries’ trade policies, the
RCA is not a ‘true’ indicator of comparative advantage (hence the wording
‘revealed’ in the indicator). Unfortunately, there are no operational alternatives to
the RCA for large data sets. However, for high-income countries, tariffs and other
forms of protection on EGs is low, so the patterns of comparative advantage
estimated by the RCA index are probably sufﬁciently representative of the ‘true’
pattern of comparative advantage.
Column 4 shows the percentage of goods with a tariff peak for all goods and,
in parenthesis, for the EG list. For example Canada has a tariff peak of 9.8% for
all products but only 0.6% on the EG list. With the exception of the Philippines,
all countries who submitted lists had a lower percentage of goods with tariff
peaks on the EG list than on their respective total goods lists. By contrast, for
the non-participant countries in the bottom part of the table, often the
percentage of tariff peaks in the EG list was higher than in the corresponding
list for all goods. For example, for China the percentage of tariff peaks on
the combined list is over twice as large as for all goods. In sum, the difference in
distribution of tariff peaks across the two groups is suggestive of why developing
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countries would not have wanted to participate in the submission process since
they might have been ‘forced’ to accept reducing tariffs on goods in which they
had tariff peaks.
Table 2. Tariff peaks and revealed comparative advantage: all products and EGs
Reporter name
Col. 1d
Goodsa
RCA>1
All
goods
Col. 2
Goodsb
RCA>1
EGsg
Col. 3
Tariff
peaksc
All goodsa
(EGs in
parent. b)
Col. 4
Submissions
with RCA>1
Col. 5
Av. Applied tariffse
All
goods
Col. 6
Submissions
Col. 7
% % % % % %
Canada (CAN) [164] 17 17 9.8 (0.6) 16.5 3.6 1.3
European Union (EU-27)
[164]
45 68*** 1.7 (0.2) 78.1 1.64 0.6
Japan (JPN) [219] 23 42*** 8.6 (0.0) 43.8 2.8 0.1
Korea (KOR) [164] 15 19* 1.3 (0.0) 14.6 8.3 5.3
New Zealand (NZL)
[164]
13 9† 8.2 (1.6) 9.8 3.7 3.4
Norway (NOR) [164] 6 10*** 2.8 (0.0) 12.2 0.6 0
Philippines (PHL) [17] 9 7†† 4.8 (14.6) 0 5.0 2.3
Qatar (QAT) [20] 2 2 0.1 (0.0) 20 3.8 4.5
Saudi Arabia (SAU) [262] 4 4 0.1 (0.0) 5 4.0 4.5
Singapore (SGP) [72] 14 20*** 0.0 (0.0) 29 0 0
Switzerland (CHE) [164] 22 36*** 0.0 (0.0) 51 0 0
United States (USA) [164] 37 52*** 5.7 (0.2) 58 2.8 0.83
Taiwan (TWN) [164] n.a. n.a. 6.2 (1.4) 0 5.3 3.1
Argentina (ARG) 11 9† 0.2 (0.9)
Brazil (BRA) 16 18 0.2 (0.7)
Chile (CHL) 7 2††† 0.0 (0.0)
China (CHN) 40 34††† 1.6 (3.6)
India (IND) 30 23††† 1.6 (1.9)
Mexico (MEX) 17 22** 0.1 (0.2)
Russian Fed. (RUS) 8 6 0.0 (0.0)
South Africa (ZAF) 15 14 7.7 (1.7)
Notes:
a 4920 HS-6 products;
bWTO combined list (411 products);
c Tariff peaks: a tariff rate at least three times the average tariff over all HS-6 goods;
d Number of goods submitted (See text);
e Average effectively applied (unweighted) tariff on all goods and on the submission list
(in brackets in col. 1)
g * (resp. †) indicates that the proportion of EGs with an RCA>1 (col. 3) is signiﬁcantly higher
(resp. lower) than the proportion of goods with a RCA>1 (col. 2). The number of symbols indicate
the conventional levels of signiﬁcance (*** or ††† for the 1% conﬁdence level, **or †† for the 5%,
and *or † for the 10% level).
Sources: RCA (cols 2 & 3): WITS, Trade Indicators. Tariffs: TRAINS data. Year=2007, HS 2002
classiﬁcation. Countries below line (Starting with Argentina did not submit a list).
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Towhat extent does the EG list (the WTO combined list) reﬂect characteristics of
those who participated in the submission process. First, we check whether the
selection of goods in the submission lists was ‘by chance’ (rather than according
to comparative advantage). With 4920 HS-6 products in the sample for 2007, and
411 products in the EG list, there is a 411/4920=8.3% probability that a HS-6
heading is an EG good. Among those that submitted a list, the probability that a
selected product has an RCA>1 ranges from 45% for the EU to 2% for Qatar. So
the probability that a randomly selected EU export with an RCA>1 is on the WTO
combined list is 45%*8.3%=3.7% and for Qatar is 2%*8.3%=0.1%. (For the
Philippines, the corresponding probability is 9%*8.3%=0.7%.) Except for Qatar
and Saudi Arabia, these probabilities (in the range 0.7%–3.7%) are much lower
than the percentages reported in column 3. The EG list has a greater share of goods
with an RCA>1 for submitters than if they had been pulled out of a hat. As to tariff
peaks, the pattern is opposite. Taking countries with tariff peaks on more than 4%
of all goods (for the others tariff peaks are negligible), if selection had been random,
the probability that it would be a good with a tariff peak would have ranged from
(4.8%*8.3%=0.4%) for Philippines to (9.8%*8.3%=0.8%) for Canada. So the
EG list has fewer products with tariff peaks among submitters than if they had been
selected randomly among the products with tariff peaks.
For each country in table 2, ﬁgure 4 plots the share of goods with an RCA>1 on
the EG list against the share of goods with an RCA>1 in total goods exported by
that country on the horizontal axis.28 Since submitters generally refrained from
picking goods with tariff peaks, so one can safely assume that they were looking to
secure in the combined list goods in which they had a comparative advantage. If all
countries had the same success in this presumed objective, all the points would be
on, or close to, the 45° line. This is generally not the case as just about all countries
that submitted lists are above the 45°. Not surprisingly, high-income countries who
participated had a comparative advantage in the goods selected on the combined
list that they helped construct. Second, non-participation is clearly revealed in
the ﬁgure as all non-participants (except Mexico) are below the 45° line. The
Philippines, the only developing country on the submission list is also below the
45° line. It is then not surprising that developing countries did not submit lists.29
Third, among participants, with the exception of New Zealand, Qatar and Saudi
Arabia, it is the high-income countries that have a pattern of RCA skewed towards
28 Since no country exports all goods (the range is from 1,830 goods for Qatar to 4,920 for India), in
ﬁgure 4, for each country, the share of goods with an RCA>1 in total goods exported (horizontal axis) is
computed over the number of goods that country exports. This is the more relevant measure for measuring
a country’s inﬂuence in the selection process. All shares are higher, the largest increase being for Qatar
(from 2% in table 2 to 4% in ﬁgure 4).
29Only one developing country, Philippines submitted a list. However, one observation is insufﬁcient
for generalization. Indeed the WTO-UNEP 2009 report (p. 82) notes that 11 countries were a top-ﬁve
exporter for at least one of the products listed as renewable energy at the HS-6 level.
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EGs. This could simply reﬂect one of the stylized facts behind the environmental
Kuznets curve, namely that the demand for higher environmental quality is a
normal good. Finally, some developing countries, such as Mexico, India and
China, could have been expected to participate as they had high shares of goods
with an RCA>1. All in all, the pattern in ﬁgure 4 where developing countries are
usually below the 45° line gives support to the often-heard complaint by developing
countries that goods in the EG list are of little export interest to them.
Consider now the selection process leading to the EG list. As discussed in Section
2.2 (also see ﬁgure 1), a long negotiation process took place between 2002 and
2010. We have limited information on the successive lists proposed during the
submission period, as well as about the bargaining among the nine ‘friends’.
Therefore we cannot study the negotiation process among the nine countries
that led to the joint submission under the ‘Friends’ list’ of 2007 (the 9M list of
164 products – see the number of products in the submission lists in table 2, column
1), nor can we study the successive submissions. So we study the characteristics of
the ﬁnal submission lists. Column 5 gives the percentage of goods with an RCA >1
Figure 4. Comparative advantage in EGs vs overall comparative advantage
(2007)
Notes: Percentages of goods with a Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) greater than 1.
Countries above (below) the 45° line have a larger (smaller) proportion of goods with a comparative
advantage in EGs than in the overall distribution of comparative advantage across all products.
Source: Authors, from WITS Trade Indicators.
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in the respective lists. For example, Canada had an RCA>1 for 16.5% of the
products on the 9M list. This percentage is low but not surprising, since,
with the exception of Switzerland and Norway, the small countries in the friends’
list had a much smaller share of goods with an RCA>1 than the US (58%) and
the EU (78%). This outcome reﬂects the larger share of goods with an RCA>1 for
those two countries, but far more it reﬂects their bargaining power within the
group.30
Overwhelmingly, countries did not propose including highly protected goods.
Inspection of the data (not reported here) shows that of the 118 goods in the tariff
peak range, only 22 goods with tariff peaks were proposed for inclusion in the lists,
that is less than 20% of the products with tariff peaks. Philippines, a developing
country, is no exception: it has tariff peaks in close to 10% of the products in
the combined list, yet of the 17 products it suggested for inclusion, none belonged
to the list of 31 products with a tariff peak. This is also conﬁrmed by the ﬁgures in
the last two columns of table 2 which show that the average effectively applied
tariff for goods on the submission lists are lower than the average tariff on the
universe of goods. The exceptions were Saudi Arabia and Qatar for whom goods
on their submission list had a signiﬁcantly higher average tariff.
Finally, we check further how consistent these patterns are with predictions
from the theory of endogenous protection. A large literature has developed on
the determinants of protection since the inﬂuence-driven approach proposed
by Grossman and Helpman (1994), itself an extension of the political-support
approach proposed by Hillman (1982) in which governments choose redistributive
policies taking into account lobby contributions. The key insight of that literature
is that, controlling for the importance attributed to consumers’ welfare by the
government, equilibrium protection should be higher in large sectors and lower in
sectors that produce intermediate goods since they are subject to counter-lobbying
by downstream sectors. Applying this approach to the choice of goods to put up on
a list for tariff reduction, in the absence of data on production and on intermediate
use at this disaggregated level, one would expect that due to lobbying, goods with
high tariffs would stand a lower probability of being selected. One would also
expect that lobbies in industries in which countries have a comparative advantage
would push for having these goods included in the submission list.
For each country I=1,. . .,13, we estimate separately the following probit in
which the probability that good j will be on the list of country i is a function of
RCAj and of the height of the applied tariff on good j, TARIFFj:
Pr(LISTj = 1) = φ(α0 + α1RCAj + α2TARIFFj); j = 1, . . . ,411 (0.2)
30 Again, in probabilistic terms, the share of products with RCA>1 for Canada and Korea in the EG
list is close to their share in the universe of products, while for the US and (especially) for the EU, their share
in the EG list is close to twice their share in the universe of products. There are two exceptions, Norway and
Switzerland, which have the largest percentage discrepancies.
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where φ is the cumulative normal distribution, α0 is a constant, RCAj is the index of
revealed comparative advantage deﬁned in (0.1) above, and TARIFFj is the average
effective tariff applied on imports of good j.
Results in table 3 reveal two patterns. For countries on the friend’s list, with the
exception of Korea and New Zealand, the negative estimate for α2 conﬁrms that
submissions excluded the more highly protected goods (Norway and Switzerland
having zero tariffs on goods in the EG list are not concerned). For Qatar and Saudi
Arabia (along with New Zealand), the probability of being on the submission
list included was positively correlated with the height of the tariff on the good. In
general, the correlation with the index of revealed comparative is unstable and/or
not signiﬁcant. This is not surprising insofar as it could reﬂect the loss of support
from exporters to push for tariff reductions as the low level of protection reduce
the gains from tariff reductions.31 The pooled results at the bottom of the table
conﬁrm that for the whole sample of submissions, goods with high protection were
excluded from the submission lists.
Table 3. Probit estimates of determinants of products on liberalization lists
Country
Revealed comparative
advantage
Applied tariff
(simple average)
Column: (A) (B) (C)
EU-27 0.17** −0.26***
JPN 0.02 −0.49***
USA 0.00 −0.21***
TWN −0.01 −0.06***
CAN −0.07* −0.08**
NZL −0.02 0.07***
QAT 0.01 0.31**
SAU 0.03 0.26***
KOR −0.14** 0.00
PHL −0.21 −0.05
SGP 0.15*** N.A.
NOR 0.04 N.A.
CHE 0.04 N.A.
Pooled (13) 0.01 −0.03***
Pooled (13-SGP, NOR CHE 0.01 −0.05***
Notes: Since Singapore, Norway and Switzerland, applied a tariff rate of 0 on EGs, the TARIFF variable
is dropped from eq (1).N.A.=not applicable.
Source: Authors’ estimates.
31 The successful reduction in tariffs under the GATT followed by the large unilateral reduction in
tariffs by developing countries since the creation of the WTO (to attract the foreign direct investment
necessary to participate in the global production chain) has erased the strength of reciprocity necessary for
the success of multilateral tariff-reduction negotiations. See Baldwin (2010) for further elaboration.
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6. Conclusions
Symptomatic of the cleavages across countries throughout the Doha negotiations,
little progress was achieved in deﬁning an approach to reducing protection of
EGs – this in spite of the Doha Round being called the Round for ‘developing
countries and for the protection of the environment’. Conﬂicting interests and
differing perceptions of the beneﬁts provided by EGs were reﬂected in the different
proposed approaches (request and offer, integrated project, list approach, hybrid
approach). And for the thirteen countries that adopted a list approach, there was
minimal product overlap across submissions.
The paper then reviewed progress (by income group) at reducing tariffs
unilaterally over the period 1996–2010. For all income groups, on average, EGs
are less protected than other goods and, during the period, countries reduced
protection by about 50% from initial levels. Protection of EGs remains highest in
the low-income group, and the absolute gap in protection between the low-income
group and the other developing country groups remained constant over the period
1996–2010. Should a standstill compromise be concluded whereby tariffs would
be bound at the current applied MFN rate rather than at the current bound rate,
the upper middle-income countries would lose the most discretionary leeway in
tariff-setting.
At ﬁrst sight, the lack of progress in the negotiations might appear paradoxical
since average effective applied protection in 2010 was low regardless of the
selection of goods for an EG list (for a ‘core’ group of 26 EGs for a list of 104
WTO members, average MFN applied tariffs ranged from less than 1% for
developed countries to 5% for low-income countries). Yet, with the exception
of China who proposed a common list and a development list (drawn from the
common list) for exemption or lower tariff reductions to reﬂect the principle of
‘less than full reciprocity’, developing countries refrained from proposing a list
approach. Few developing countries tabled propositions. Brazil proposed a request
and offer approach, and Argentina and India proposed an integrated approach.
Either alternative was perceived as a shield from an across-the-board tariff cut
under a list approach which might have led to deep tariff cuts. With low tariffs all
around, expected beneﬁts from lobbying to open partners’ markets would be low,
but so would be adjustment costs for tariff reductions on domestic markets.
Two reasons for the lack of progress in the negotiations were then discussed, one
related to the implications of the large range of perceptions about the beneﬁts that
EGs fulﬁll (better management of the environment to less harmful effects on the
environment), the other to the political economy of trade policy formulation.
Regarding perceptions of the environmental beneﬁts provided by EGs (e.g.
improving the management of the environment, or shifting towards producing
goods that are environmentally preferable), these are difﬁcult to deﬁne. Countries
would have to overcome the difﬁcult hurdle of agreeing on a new HS classiﬁcation
system that would encompass these objectives. Perhaps difﬁculty in reaching
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agreement in a large group of negotiators explains why APEC members agreed in
September 2012 on a list of 54 EGs on which they would reduce tariffs. If the
current stalemate in the negotiations is indicative of delays in devising new HS
classiﬁcation system, negotiations could last a long time.
We then studied the lists that 13 countries submitted for tariff reductions and the
resulting combined list of 411 goods drawn by the WTO on the basis of the various
submissions. Assuming that countries would participate to have included in a
combined list goods in which they had a comparative advantage (measured by the
index of ‘revealed comparative advantage’) and/or high (low) tariffs, we conﬁrmed
that the WTO list reﬂected disproportionately goods in which these countries had a
comparative advantage, and excluded, again disproportionately, goods in which
they had high tariffs. This mercantilistic approach to trade negotiations was also
evident in the Vladivostok declaration of September 2012 in which APEC members
agreed to reduce applied tariffs to 5% or less on a list of 54 EGs (all from the WTO
combined list) by the end of 2015. Indeed, APEC members accounted for 70% of
world exports for the products in this list.
And if this combined list could be construed as approximating a comprehensive
list of EGs, then the major developing countries that might have been expected
to participate in the submission of lists, had a smaller proportion of goods than
those who participated, conﬁrming their perception that a list approach would end
up mostly reﬂecting the comparative advantage of high-income countries. In the
end, with average tariffs for EGs close to three times higher for developing
countries compared with high-income countries, reciprocal trade gains would be
from bilateral reductions between developing countries. However, overall, it is the
developed countries that generally have a comparative advantage in EGs.
Interestingly, for countries that participated in the submission list process, even
though they refrained from submitting products with high tariffs, their average
effective applied tariffs on the goods in this comprehensive list were less than their
average protection for all goods while the opposite held for a selection of major
developing countries that might have been expected to participate in the submission
process The so-called ‘friends’ list’ that collected the submissions of nine OECD
countries showed that, with the exception of Switzerland and Norway, the small
countries had little bargaining power as they had a much lower share of goods in
which they had a comparative advantage in the submission list than they would
have had if shares in the combined list were equal to their share of goods with a
comparative advantage in the universe of HS goods. In sum, the combined/core list
drawn up for negotiations in 2010 was mostly made up of products in which large
developed countries had a comparative advantage, and developed countries
generally avoided submitting goods that were highly protected, leading to the
conclusion that the Doha mandate requesting countries to negotiate on means
to reduce protection on EGs (article 31) elicited a mercantilistic response.
This response helps explain why developing countries have been reluctant
to negotiate tariffs reductions on environmental goods. This outcome is all the
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more regrettable as recent research suggests that the elimination of protection
on environmental goods would help technology transfer towards developing
countries. From an inspection of a large sample of Clean Development Mechanism
projects, Schmid (2012) shows that projects are more likely to have a technology
transfer component when host-countries’ tariffs are low, and estimates that a 10%
increase in the applied MFN tariff rate on environmental goods is associated with
a 3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of technology transfer in a project.
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